Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Actualism and Possible Worlds', 'The Common-Sense View of Reality' and 'The Concept of Mind'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
18005 Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
20728 Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
14664 Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
20726 We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
20727 Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
20729 Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
20730 If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
20731 The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
14297 A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
14300 No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
14666 Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
14662 Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16472 Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
2622 Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
1353 Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
1354 We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2624 I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
2620 Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2388 Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
3354 You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2387 How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16469 Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
16470 Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
14663 Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]