39 ideas
3240 | There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel] |
3242 | Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel] |
3241 | It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel] |
3248 | Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel] |
20989 | Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel] |
22354 | Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
6299 | Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik] |
6304 | Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik] |
6300 | Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik] |
6303 | Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik] |
6302 | Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik] |
6295 | There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik] |
6296 | Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik] |
6301 | Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik] |
14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga] |
14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga] |
14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
3249 | Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel] |
22429 | We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel] |
3247 | Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel] |
3252 | Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel] |
3251 | Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel] |
3244 | Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel] |
3245 | The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel] |
3246 | I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel] |
16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga] |
3257 | Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel] |
3265 | We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel] |
3263 | If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel] |
3256 | Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel] |
3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel] |
3258 | If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel] |
3254 | If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel] |
3264 | We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel] |
3255 | We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel] |
3262 | Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel] |