Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'World and Essence', 'Summula philosophiae naturalis' and 'Introduction to Virtue Ethics'

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24 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
16608 Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16599 Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
16681 Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
7096 We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
7098 There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
7099 With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
7100 Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
7102 Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
7095 Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
7094 Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
7104 The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman]
7093 Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
7103 Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman]