34 ideas
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| 19740 | A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle] |
| 17000 | We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke] |
| 11868 | A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke] |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| 17044 | A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke] |
| 16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
| 17058 | What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke] |
| 4970 | What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke] |
| 17059 | Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke] |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| 4950 | Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke] |
| 17003 | Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke] |
| 9221 | The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider] |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| 17052 | The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 4969 | I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke] |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
| 4956 | A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke] |
| 17032 | Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke] |
| 398 | Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle] |
| 394 | An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle] |
| 396 | There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle] |
| 16102 | Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 17463 | An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle] |
| 399 | If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle] |
| 20918 | Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle] |
| 402 | The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle] |
| 403 | The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle] |
| 1498 | Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle] |
| 395 | It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle] |