11 ideas
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
13766 | 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
19143 | Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
4366 | We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse] |