Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Epistemology of Modality', 'Nature and Observability of Causal Relations' and 'Philosophical Remarks'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]