19 ideas
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| 12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
| 17963 | The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories [Hilbert] |
| 17966 | Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent [Hilbert] |
| 12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
| 17967 | To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself [Hilbert] |
| 17965 | The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations [Hilbert] |
| 17964 | Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers [Hilbert] |
| 12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
| 12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
| 10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
| 17968 | By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert] |