Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Understanding and Essence', 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier' and 'Remarks on axiomatised set theory'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]