175 ideas
| 15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
| 15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
| 15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
| 15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
| 11283 | There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 1672 | Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle] |
| 1684 | Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle] |
| 15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 12145 | Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle] |
| 12075 | An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12384 | Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle] |
| 9066 | You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle] |
| 12382 | What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle] |
| 1668 | An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle] |
| 12376 | Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle] |
| 12373 | Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle] |
| 12363 | Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle] |
| 13004 | Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
| 12377 | Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle] |
| 12372 | The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle] |
| 15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
| 12369 | A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle] |
| 15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
| 15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
| 15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
| 15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
| 15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
| 15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
| 15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
| 15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
| 18910 | To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle] |
| 15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
| 15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
| 15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
| 15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
| 1675 | Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle] |
| 1677 | We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle] |
| 15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
| 1687 | Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle] |
| 1681 | Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle] |
| 15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
| 15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
| 15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
| 12146 | Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle] |
| 15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
| 17039 | The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle] |
| 11994 | Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
| 15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
| 15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
| 12381 | What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle] |
| 15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
| 1690 | A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle] |
| 15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
| 15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
| 15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
| 15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
| 15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
| 15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
| 15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
| 15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
| 15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
| 15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
| 15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
| 19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
| 15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
| 12072 | For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12073 | 'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12378 | The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle] |
| 12364 | We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle] |
| 12370 | Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle] |
| 12366 | We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle] |
| 1685 | No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle] |
| 1673 | Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle] |
| 15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
| 12379 | You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle] |
| 16725 | Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle] |
| 15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
| 15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
| 15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 23309 | Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 1693 | Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle] |
| 9067 | Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle] |
| 1671 | Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle] |
| 1670 | When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle] |
| 1691 | Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle] |
| 12383 | There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle] |
| 1674 | All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle] |
| 24068 | Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 17310 | Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 21359 | Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle] |
| 1667 | Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle] |
| 12365 | We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle] |
| 10918 | Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle] |
| 12374 | Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle] |
| 12148 | Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle] |
| 1679 | Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle] |
| 1680 | Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle] |
| 12371 | A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle] |
| 12147 | The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle] |
| 15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
| 15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
| 15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
| 15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
| 15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 1683 | We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle] |
| 15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
| 15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
| 12380 | Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle] |
| 12367 | What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle] |
| 12385 | Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle] |
| 1689 | Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle] |
| 15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
| 1686 | What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle] |
| 15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 12357 | Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 1669 | The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle] |
| 15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
| 15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
| 15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 1678 | Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle] |
| 9068 | Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle] |
| 9069 | A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle] |
| 15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
| 15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
| 9070 | We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle] |
| 12368 | Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle] |
| 15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
| 1692 | If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle] |
| 12375 | Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle] |
| 15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
| 15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
| 15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
| 15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
| 15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
| 15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
| 15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
| 15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
| 15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
| 15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
| 15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
| 15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
| 15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
| 1688 | Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle] |
| 15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |