Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Epistemology of Modality', 'The Nature of Mental States' and 'Letters to Russell'

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12 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]