Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Epistemology of Modality', 'The Nature of Mental States' and 'Aristotle's Theory of Substance'

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12 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]