Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Understanding and Essence', 'Remarks on the forces of inorganic Nature' and 'The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
19259 If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
18270 Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
19262 Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
19267 Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
19268 Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19265 Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
18263 The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
18272 Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
19266 In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18266 Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
19264 Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
13605 Gravity isn't a force, because it produces effects without diminishing [Mayer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
18279 Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa]