12 ideas
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| 13230 | Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M] |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 15282 | Facts should be deducible from the theory and initial conditions, and prefer the simpler theory [Osiander, by Harré/Madden] |
| 13229 | Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M] |
| 13231 | Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M] |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |