13 ideas
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| 12270 | Being is one [Melissus, by Aristotle] |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
| 21378 | We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them [Schopenhauer] |
| 3059 | There is no real motion, only the appearance of it [Melissus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5100 | The void is not required for change, because a plenum can alter in quality [Aristotle on Melissus] |
| 456 | Nothing could come out of nothing [Melissus] |