23 ideas
19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |