Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Understanding and Essence', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary' and 'Cogitata et Visa'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricists are collecting ants; rationalists are spinning spiders; and bees do both [Bacon]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid]