17 ideas
| 18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
| 9978 | Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait] |
| 18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
| 18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
| 18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
| 18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
| 9986 | The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait] |
| 9984 | We can have a series with identical members [Tait] |
| 18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
| 18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
| 19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
| 9981 | Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait] |
| 9982 | Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait] |
| 9985 | Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait] |
| 9972 | Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait] |
| 9980 | If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait] |
| 18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |