Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Understanding and Essence', 'Plural Quantification' and 'The Metaontology of Abstraction'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
19259 If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
10633 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
12223 It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10638 A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
12230 Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10640 Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
10636 Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
10639 Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
10635 Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
10641 Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
12225 Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
12224 Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
12226 The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
10643 We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
10637 Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
12229 Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18443 A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
19262 Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
19267 Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
19268 Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19265 Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
19266 In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
19264 Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
12227 Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
12228 Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
12231 Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
10634 Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]