41 ideas
5988 | Anaximander produced the first philosophy book (and maybe the first book) [Anaximander, by Bodnár] |
17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
1496 | The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle] |
17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
14874 | Anaximander saw the contradiction in the world - that its own qualities destroy it [Anaximander, by Nietzsche] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
1495 | Anaximander introduced the idea that the first principle and element of things was the Boundless [Anaximander, by Simplicius] |
405 | The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless [Anaximander] |
13222 | The Boundless cannot exist on its own, and must have something contrary to it [Aristotle on Anaximander] |
404 | Things begin and end in the Unlimited, and are balanced over time according to justice [Anaximander] |
17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |
1746 | The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable [Anaximander, by Diog. Laertius] |