10 ideas
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 15119 | Aristotelian explanation by essence may need to draw on knowledge of other essences [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 1497 | For Anaximenes nature is air, which takes different forms by rarefaction and condensation [Anaximenes, by Simplicius] |
| 23302 | Plants have far less life than animals, but more life than other corporeal entities [Aristotle] |
| 23301 | There is a gradual proceeding from the inanimate to animals, with no clear borderlines [Aristotle] |