Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'book (lost)', 'works' and 'In Defence of Pure Reason'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
3695 Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
3651 Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
3700 Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
3697 The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
3704 Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour]
3707 Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
3696 A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour]
3703 You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour]
3706 A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3699 The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3701 Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
3702 Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
3709 Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
15473 How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2981 Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2985 Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
3135 Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
2983 Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor]
3708 All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3698 Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
1497 For Anaximenes nature is air, which takes different forms by rarefaction and condensation [Anaximenes, by Simplicius]