38 ideas
19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
22049 | Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie] |
22055 | The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie] |
22054 | German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie] |
22056 | Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie] |
19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |