Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'German Philosophy: a very short introduction', 'The Doctrine of Necessity Examined' and 'Explanation and Reference'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


14 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie]
German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie]
Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce]