21 ideas
10757 | Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg] |
10751 | Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg] |
10759 | There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg] |
10753 | Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg] |
10752 | Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg] |
10754 | In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg] |
10756 | A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg] |
10758 | If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg] |
10761 | Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg] |
10755 | A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg] |
22049 | Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie] |
22055 | The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie] |
22054 | German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie] |
22056 | Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie] |
19544 | Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske] |
19545 | We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske] |
19546 | Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske] |
19547 | Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske] |
19548 | The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske] |
19549 | P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske] |
19550 | We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske] |