Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'German Philosophy: a very short introduction', 'The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction' and 'Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology'

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15 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie]
German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie]
Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience [Rey]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena [Rey]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed [Rey]
'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity [Rey]
Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable [Rey]
The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used [Rey]
An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical) [Rey]
Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity [Rey]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey]