Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'German Philosophy: a very short introduction', 'What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?' and 'Properties'

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29 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
8679 We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
9942 Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10405 In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10407 Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
18062 Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
10868 The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg]
13517 If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
10271 Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
10421 Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
10410 Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10399 If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
10416 Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
10417 There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10413 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10402 Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
10400 Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
10403 If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
10406 One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
22049 Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
22055 The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie]
22054 German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie]
22056 Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
10404 Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
10408 Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
10409 Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
10401 The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
10420 Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
10412 If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
10411 Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]