Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'German Philosophy: a very short introduction', 'Mathematical Truth' and 'From Supervenience to Superdupervenience'

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13 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
9935 Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
17927 Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan]
9936 The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
16052 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T]
16053 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16056 Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16054 Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T]
16055 Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
22049 Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
22055 The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie]
22054 German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie]
22056 Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
16057 Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T]