Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'German Philosophy: a very short introduction', 'The Apology' and 'Universal Prescriptivism'

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15 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie]
German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie]
Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
If goodness needs true opinion but not knowledge, you can skip the 'examined life' [Vlastos on Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]