29 ideas
| 1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
| 1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
| 1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
| 23623 | Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack] |
| 23624 | The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack] |
| 23625 | Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack] |
| 23628 | The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack] |
| 23627 | 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack] |
| 23626 | Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack] |
| 23621 | Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack] |
| 23622 | We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack] |
| 22049 | Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie] |
| 22055 | The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie] |
| 22054 | German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie] |
| 22056 | Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie] |
| 1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
| 1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
| 1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
| 1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
| 1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
| 1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
| 1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
| 1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
| 1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
| 1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
| 1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
| 1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
| 1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
| 1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |