Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'German Philosophy: a very short introduction', 'Equality and Partiality' and 'Logical Necessity'

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
12204 The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
12195 Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
12199 There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
12201 We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
12194 Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
12198 Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14532 A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12193 Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
12200 A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
12202 Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12203 If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
22049 Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
22055 The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie]
22054 German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie]
22056 Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
6479 Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
6450 Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
6447 Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
6446 In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
6477 I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
6448 A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
6478 Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel]