37 ideas
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
9570 | In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara] |
10260 | Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
8958 | In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó] |
18221 | 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H] |
8757 | The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H] |
18212 | Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H] |
10261 | The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
18218 | Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H] |
9623 | Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H] |
18215 | It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H] |
18214 | Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H] |
18216 | Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H] |
18210 | Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
18211 | You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H] |
8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó] |
18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
22049 | Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie] |
22055 | The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie] |
22054 | German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie] |
22056 | Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie] |
18222 | Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H] |
9917 | 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H] |
18223 | In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H] |
18220 | Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H] |
18219 | Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |