16 ideas
21546 | We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell] |
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
21531 | Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell] |
21545 | I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
22049 | Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie] |
22055 | The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie] |
22054 | German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie] |
22056 | Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |