21 ideas
14965 | Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta] |
14968 | A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta] |
22246 | A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati] |
14964 | The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta] |
14969 | Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta] |
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
22247 | Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati] |
22248 | How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati] |
22242 | Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati] |
22243 | The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati] |
22245 | A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati] |
22250 | There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati] |
22249 | The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati] |