22 ideas
| 11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
| 11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
| 11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
| 11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
| 11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
| 11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
| 11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
| 11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
| 11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
| 11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
| 11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 2957 | Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood] |
| 3285 | We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |