Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Bhagavad Gita', 'Questions on Aristotle's Physics' and 'In a Critical Condition'

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57 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Serene wisdom is freedom from ties, and indifference to fortune [Anon (Bhag)]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason [Anon (Bhag)]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
I am all the beauty and goodness of things, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
How do you count beliefs? [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor]
Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor]
Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor]
Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor]
Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor]
Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor]
Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor]
Modules make the world manageable [Fodor]
Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor]
Rationality rises above modules [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Hate and lust have their roots in man's lower nature [Anon (Bhag)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in a just war [Anon (Bhag)]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The visible forms of nature are earth, water, fire, air, ether; mind, reason, and the sense of 'I' [Anon (Bhag)]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
Everything, including the gods, comes from me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Brahman is supreme, Atman his spirit in man, and Karma is the force of creation [Anon (Bhag)]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Only by love can men see me, know me, and come to me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / e. Hell
The three gates of hell are lust, anger and greed [Anon (Bhag)]