Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Bhagavad Gita', 'Causation and Explanation' and 'Logical Pluralism'

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67 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Serene wisdom is freedom from ties, and indifference to fortune [Anon (Bhag)]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason [Anon (Bhag)]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
(∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall]
Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall]
A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall]
It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall]
Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / d. The Preface paradox
Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
I am all the beauty and goodness of things, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos]
The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos]
If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos]
There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos]
An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Hate and lust have their roots in man's lower nature [Anon (Bhag)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in a just war [Anon (Bhag)]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The visible forms of nature are earth, water, fire, air, ether; mind, reason, and the sense of 'I' [Anon (Bhag)]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos]
Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos]
We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
"All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos]
It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos]
A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos]
The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos]
Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
Everything, including the gods, comes from me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Brahman is supreme, Atman his spirit in man, and Karma is the force of creation [Anon (Bhag)]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Only by love can men see me, know me, and come to me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / e. Hell
The three gates of hell are lust, anger and greed [Anon (Bhag)]