57 ideas
2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
7482 | Resurrection developed in Judaism as a response to martyrdoms, in about 160 BCE [Anon (Dan), by Watson] |
2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |