Combining Texts

All the ideas for '27: Book of Daniel', 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' and 'The Metaontology of Abstraction'

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30 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Resurrection developed in Judaism as a response to martyrdoms, in about 160 BCE [Anon (Dan), by Watson]