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All the ideas for 'Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments', 'Animal Rights and Wrongs' and 'The Conscious Mind'

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94 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers]
Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton]
'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)]
Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)]
Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton]
Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers]
What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers]
Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers]
Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers]
Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton]
Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton]
Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton]
Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton]
Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton]
Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton]
Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton]
An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton]
I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton]
Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton]
We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton]
Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton]
Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton]
Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton]
Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton]
Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton]
Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers]