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All the ideas for 'Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments', 'German Philosophy 1760-1860' and 'Causation'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
Wolff's version of Leibniz dominated mid-18th C German thought [Pinkard]
Romantics explored beautiful subjectivity, and the re-enchantment of nature [Pinkard]
The combination of Kant and the French Revolution was an excited focus for German philosophy [Pinkard]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
In Hegel's time naturalism was called 'Spinozism' [Pinkard]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Idealism is the link between reason and freedom [Pinkard]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)]
Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)]
Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]