Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Things', 'Understanding and Essence' and 'Thought and Talk'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
19259 If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
6396 A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
9406 A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
15730 Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15728 The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton]
9407 Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
15729 Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
8520 An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
19262 Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
19267 Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
19268 Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19265 Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
11145 Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
6397 The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
19266 In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
6392 Thought depends on speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
6393 A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
19264 Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
11144 Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
6395 An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
6394 The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson]