Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Things', 'Locke on Essences and Kinds' and 'Aboutness'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
18996 A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
19006 An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
9406 A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
18999 y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
19001 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
19002 A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
15730 Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15728 The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton]
9407 Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
15729 Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
8520 An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
18998 Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
15642 If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
15645 Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
15643 Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19004 Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
19007 A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
18993 If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo]
19003 Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18992 Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
18994 The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
18997 Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
19005 Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
15641 Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle]