34 ideas
18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
7548 | Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell] |
7545 | Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell] |
15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
7546 | A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell] |
18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
7550 | We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell] |
18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |
7547 | Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell] |
7551 | Matter is a logical construction [Russell] |
7552 | Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell] |