15 ideas
| 17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
| 17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
| 9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
| 15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
| 9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
| 15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
| 8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
| 9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
| 9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |
| 9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |