19 ideas
| 18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
| 22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
| 15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
| 9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
| 15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
| 8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
| 18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |