17 ideas
| 12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
| 14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
| 9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
| 14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
| 15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
| 15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
| 9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
| 15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
| 8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
| 14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
| 14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
| 12163 | Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton] |
| 12162 | In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton] |
| 12159 | Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton] |
| 12160 | In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton] |
| 12161 | We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton] |
| 14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |