Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Things', 'Truth and the Past' and 'Properties'

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21 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
9406 A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
8195 Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
8194 Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
8190 Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
8198 A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
8192 I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
15730 Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
18430 We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15728 The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton]
9407 Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18432 Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
15729 Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
18437 Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
8520 An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
18434 That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
8199 The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
8193 Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
8189 Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett]
8191 The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
8197 Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
8196 The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett]