Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Things', 'works' and 'Mental Content'

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26 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton]
Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P]
Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P]