15 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
| 9052 | Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith] |
| 15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
| 15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
| 9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
| 15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
| 16070 | There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman] |
| 8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |