Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Things', 'Reply to First Objections' and 'Philosophy of Language'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton]
Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes]